ABSTRACT In the 1990s, the 'Decade of the Brain', a number of digital and electronic resources have been created to enable the rationalization and integration of the various sub-fields of neuroscience. This approach has been described as 'neuroinformatics'. An important subset of tools (atlases of the brain) developed in the Human Brain Project is examined in detail in order to understand how the use of these tools changes the practice of science. In the course of the development of atlases, what constitutes 'objective' neuroscientific knowledge is redefined in important ways, according to both technological possibilities built into these tools and to the constraints of standardization inherent in projects that involve multiple measurements. The constitution of objectivity is examined across a number of levels (ontological, epistemic, pragmatic) and the concept of 'digital objectivity' is suggested as a label for a particular configuration of ideals, techniques and objects of knowledge in cyberscience.
in other fields -neuroscientists were not the only ones addressing the need or desirability to develop databases and electronic resources around the turn of the last decade. Other communities (as diverse as oceanography, geography, physics and molecular biology) were also considering the usefulness of such tools, most frequently in terms of databases or of 'collaboratories', as a radically new way of pursuing science in geographically disperse locations. 5 Indeed, early consultations that led to the HBP involved researchers who had participated in projects like LandSat and the Human Genome Project, as well as computer scientists participating in the American Defense Mapping Agency Program. 6 Different fields, unsurprisingly, have formed different kinds of relationship to new technologies, and have experienced contrasting levels of centralized intervention and management. For example, in a recent document by the OECD Megascience Forum, members of the working group on biological informatics focused on biodiversity databases and neuroinformatics as key areas, noting that while informatics are also important to genetics, 'genomics' had already received much attention. 7 Similarly, the rationale for using informatics also varies from context to context, and may at times seem 'top-down' or user-led (see below, and note 34). Furthermore, what is understood under the label of new technologies represents a varied assortment of tools, ranging from electronic networks to digital models and databases. Finally, the changes brought about by the integration of technology are also diverse: reconfigurations of research practices, authorship, intellectual property and patterns of collaboration have all been noted, usually in relation to a specific aspect of scientific practice or to a specific field. 8 Thus studies of cyberscience have up to now examined how new objects arise, examined the constitution of data structures, or investigated how scientific work is changed by new technologies. These studies provide valuable insights and are reviewed below. Indeed, approaches to the study of cyberscience will need to vary according to the digital and electronic resources in question -perhaps most consistent (in science studies and social informatics alike) has been the argument that tool-based approaches, insensitive to use or context, are quite limited in their usefulness. 9 In addition, empirical studies of various sciences have shown that analyses of tools should also reflect on the particular disciplines in which they are developed. 10 These points are well taken, and form an important part of the analytic approach in this paper. Cyberscience can be characterized as a novel, technologically-supported organization of knowledge and knowledge-production, in which the digital format and electronic transmission of data figure prominently. I propose here another approach to cyberscience which acknowledges that current databasing and networking efforts cross disciplinary and institutional boundaries, 11 and that the integration of tools in these new research practices may mean that the distinction between types of tools (say, between databases and models) and between activities (like representing and analysing) may be difficult to draw. I therefore propose to look at the case of cyberscience in terms of its style of organization and validation of knowledge.
To frame this approach, studies of the organization of knowledge and the interactions of knowledge and technologies (rather than studies of specific tools) are most relevant. Geoffrey Bowker and Leigh Star have identified three key levels at which a classification, as a formal organization of knowledge, can be analysed. A classification can be read as a text; or it can be analysed as to the way it structures data, and in relation to the way it articulates work practices of those who use it. 12 These three levels capture the 'contents' of atlases, but also the ways in which the building of classification has an impact on the further production of knowledge, as well as on the use of such classification. The importance of computerization or digitalization, however, is not a central theme in Bowker and Star's book. Other studies, however, have addressed these aspects of the organization of knowledge, and give more prominence to the digital technologies and electronic tools used to constitute them.
A number of new objects produced through the use of digital tools have been analysed. The concomitant rise of NASA images of the earth and of the new global environmental concerns illustrates one such bind: new objects and new objections are inseparable from the new technologies that sustain them, yet there tends to be very little accountability for the ways in which technologies are developed. Donna Haraway has contrasted a number of objects (race, foetuses, genes) found both within and outside digital contexts, and notes that, paradoxically, both everything and nothing has changed through this digitalization. The 'god trick' persists; our technoscientific investments are still partial and still claim to be total. 13 Catherine Waldby's analysis of the Visible Human Project is a further demonstration that the production of 'a demonstrative visual text', the turning of flesh into (visual) data, is part of a long scientific tradition that evacuates messy bodies.
14 Indeed, the production of digitized bodies seems an especially poignant topic, when high-tech wizardry that floats in and out and through bodies seems to make light of concerns about subjective embodiment -the contrast to humanist projects of emancipation through bodily integrity can be shocking indeed. 15 To understand why these new objects look the way they do, however, it is important to look at the machineries put in place to produce them. In this vein, the work of Geoffrey Bowker is important in highlighting how new ontologies are 'performed' by digital data structures. Biodiversity, for example, is shaped by what counts for inclusion in the databases, and by how species are to be incorporated in the fields of the databases. Bowker shows how biodiversity databases can be performative at concrete levels, such as the structuring of 'fields' in a database. Databases can also perform more abstract work, such as shaping relations between disciplines -for example, as diverse types of data are entered into a database, the structure of the database will privilege the structure of data coming from particular (dominant) disciplines.
Though such data infrastructure may cause some 'hardening of the categories' (a point to which I will return in my conclusions), neither categories nor technologies that are brought in to answer calls to unify and standardize can bypass all local settings. Such machineries, though they be formal, still need to be enacted. Linda Hogles' work on organ donation highlights how meanings of individuals' lives impinge, sometimes paradoxically, on the objective descriptions that should unequivocally qualify (or disqualify) bodies as donors. Lives lived, kinds of deaths and kinship relations, find their way into medical personnel's interpretations of the suitability of bodies. 16 Local contingencies interact with formal categories to produce outcomes which might not be predicted from a study of the formal structuring of information. These findings point to the need to analyse how information is valued, as well as how it is ordered. In my analysis of atlases of the brain, I will consider objectivity not only as produced by structures and implemented in technologies, but also as an ideal, which informs further developments -and, at times, a very potent one.
Besides the intersection of digital tools with ontological and epistemic concerns, the practice of science in a digital context also warrants attention. Computers and digital tools reconfigure work, whether they be the result of celebratory attempts to streamline and rationalize certain practices, or to discipline them into a scientific ethos. Marc Berg's work on post-war medicine, and the calls for its rationalization and standardization, demonstrates how, in the process of being rationalized, the work of medicine is also transformed. 17 In other fields, as databases and datamining of sequences increase, scientists see their work shifting from 'wet' experiments in the lab to onscreen work. This is changing the kind of 'labour' involved and, in the view of some scientists, constituting a 'paradigm shift'. 18 
Representations, Ways of Knowing and Tools of Objective Knowledge
In the analysis that follows, I attempt to cut across these distinct levels of objects, modes of knowledge and work practices, by focussing on the notion of objectivity. By taking a concept that is enacted at each of these levels, this approach highlights the mutual constitutions of new objects and new ways of knowing in relation to the large-scale implementation of digital and electronic resources in neuroscience. Specifically, I consider the development of atlases of the brain, which are both objects of knowledge and tools used in research practices. Atlases are repositories and enforcers of objectivity -a concept that dances (like its scheming twin normativity) on the border between what we know to exist and how we ought to know it. In the conclusion, I will argue that digital objectivity may constitute a particular version of this dialectic, shaping the way each constructs the other. Specifically, I hope to highlight the way digital technologies may serve as a powerful interface between various techniques, and that this interfacing may entail a convergence of ways of producing knowledge in various settings. I have as a goal, not the formulation of essential features of digital technologies, but rather their characterization in relation to objectivity as a complex of technologies, such as that which Michael Lynch explores in relation to the constitution of a space of knowledge. 19 By taking a definition of informatics to be the material, technological, economic and social structures that make the information age possible, 20 I propose to consider in some detail an important set of neuroscientific tools which has been reshaped by neuroinformatics, namely, atlases of the brain, and show how the digital might be associated with a particular ideal of knowledge.
The use of informatics changes the structure and content of atlases, with particular consequences on the representation of objective knowledge about the brain. Most important for the argument developed here, however, is that atlases are meant to represent objective knowledge, a notion that might also be transformed by an informatics context. As normative instruments, atlases shape and are shaped by ideals of objectivity. As Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison demonstrate, atlases are always carefully (though not always explicitly) selective, in order to be objective. 21 Generally, however, selectivity has been considered not only necessary but also desirable. The removal of the subjective provides protection against imposing aesthetic, moral or theoretical elements on the phenomenon studied. However, the way atlases are selective differs, and Daston and Galison further identify three basic modes of objectivity (effectively, three modes of representation) in the paper atlases they survey: the ideal (a perfect, unblemished type), the characteristic (showing a representative individual) and the individual (naturalistically presented). 22 In each case, elements of 'raw' nature are selected and represented, so as to satisfy historically contingent notions of how best to achieve objectivity. The selection involved can be that of an expert whose judgement is trusted, and whose name is often borne by the atlas. Such atlases can be found in anatomy (for example, Vesalius' De Fabrica), or in neuroanatomy (Brodmann's or Talairach's atlases). Alternately, the selection of what to represent in an atlas can be based on 'mechanical objectivity', which bypasses judgement and human tendencies to deviate, embellish or vary.
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To adopt mechanical objectivity is to restrain the expert's embodied judgement and delegate the task to a technology, such as the camera, or the brain scanner. This last mode will be shown to be part of the making of brain atlases, through the use of the automated representational power of imaging technologies. 24 But while there is an overlap with the modes of objectivity associated with photographic technologies, digital technologies introduce new elements of control and restraint in achieving objectivity.
Among neuroinformatics resources, 25 atlases are a particularly interesting subset of tools to examine, since their use was well established long before the HBP. They have traditionally been key tools for neuroanatomy; they are used in research and clinical settings and, as reference works, they embody authoritative scientific knowledge. Furthermore, a focus on brain atlases, which are widely used for brain mapping, highlights how this new field of neuroscience has been central to both technological and scientific developments in the HBP. Brain mapping is often described as intrinsically interdisciplinary, and credited with fuelling the growing interest in functional anatomy, and the use of computer graphics to organize knowledge about it. 26 As well, brain mapping's colourful brains have also been central to the popular discourse of the Decade of the Brain. 27 Atlases are therefore highly visible and important tools on a number of levels and for a number of constituencies.
In the 1990s, neuroinformatics atlases were therefore built by drawing partly on existing research in the imaging and mapping community. Better atlases were needed to pursue brain-mapping studies, where scans of brain activity were to be correlated with anatomical information, creating maps of the brain in action. Brain-mapping research had been the context of new applications of traditional paper atlases, especially that of Jean Talairach.
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A number of research groups had already made efforts to improve on the contents of the atlases, and to improve and standardize the way in which researchers would compare a given case with the atlas. For the Positron Emission Tomography (PET) community, developing better atlases was seen as a way of reinforcing PET results, and the suggestion that atlases based on Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) scans should be developed was taken up as a resolution of a series of workshops held in the 1980s. 29 While atlases were already available as digital tools (often as digitized versions of paper atlases), much more was made of the digital potential of these tools as they developed within a neuroinformatics approach. In the 1990s, atlases acquired other functions, as building new atlases became part of the agenda of the Human Brain Project. The way the HBP came to promote the active integration of digital and electronic tools in research, and to champion a centralized coordination of these efforts, 30 are essential elements to understanding the new functions these atlases were meant to fulfil, and the impact of these on notions of objectivity.
Saving Neuroscience: The Threat and the Solution
Atlases were developed in a policy context that stressed not only the value of neuroscience, but also the need to intervene at the level of knowledge management on a large scale. Many countries declared the 1990s to be the Decade of the Brain, 31 although what this meant in terms of research agendas varied across regions. Whereas European science policy-makers focused their efforts on creating a 'critical mass' of neuroscientists, American concerns did not focus on 'brain drain' issues, but rather on the fact that neuroscience was becoming 'critically massive'. Leading researchers consulted by official bodies (NIH and NIMH) attributed the state of neuroscience and its recent rapid progress to advances in molecular biology, imaging, neurobiology and computational power. 32 While noting that the successes of neurosciences rightly warranted public attention and recognition, neuroscientists and policy-makers also worried that the wealth of available data was becoming the source of a crisis in neuroscience. This crisis was defined as an 'explosion of data', or a flood, deluge, glut of information, avalanche, overload, and so on. 33 This crisis affected both the individual researchers and the field, and various kinds of solutions were proposed. 34 The following scenario was often cited, echoed or paraphrased:
Brain and behavioral research has exploded in the past 2 decades because of the conceptual links that were made across different species, levels of biological organization and methodological approaches and links that were made internationally.
But this has led to specialization and decreased ability to relate to other findings:
Thus, an overload of information is threatening the very fuel that has driven brain and behavioral research to the forefront of science. 35 The solutions that dominated discussions involved the use of digital and electronic tools in neuroscience -neuroinformatics. This proposal for the use of computers had been made repeatedly, in the 1970s, '80s and throughout the '90s, too. 36 But it is a view that seemed to appeal particularly at the end of the 1980s, when plans for new resources for the neurosciences were elaborated under the aegis of a number of American Federal agencies. 37 Officials at the Institute of Medicine and members of the committee believed that the efforts would yield great improvements in the way neuroscientific research was pursued, since databases would enable hypotheses to be tested with the models to be developed, and new knowledge would arise from querying the databases. Furthermore, the pursuit of 'missing' knowledge would be rationalized, as shortcomings would be highlighted and duplications avoided. 38 The 'translation' of neuroscientific research to clinically relevant knowledge was also to be reinforced by neuroinformatics. 39 The neurosciences were therefore to be integrated through information technologies closely related and developed specifically for the neurosciences. In these reports, ideals of research management, efficiency and the rational pursuit of knowledge all came together around electronic and digital tools, these issues being transposed into a problem for which a technological fix might be provided -a neuroinformatics solution to the exploding information which kept the sub-fields of neurosciences from working together. This is only a short sketch of the many reports, consultations and discussions that led to the HBP, but this description should suffice to show the strong embedding of new tools into large-scale research policy goals. 40 These are wide-ranging, and are intended to improve neuroscience on a number of levels, from budgetary concerns (more bang for their buck) to that of the workbench (databases for checking existing data). Note that these goals are built on an implicit assumption that science progresses as more and more pieces of the puzzle are put together: 'the hope -that having all data in one place will shake loose new insights about how the brain works'. 41 (Such statements also beg questions of location of and access to this 'place').
New Atlases
In this context, neuroinformatics broadened the scope of atlases and inscribed these tools in wider research and management agendas. The atlases, which in the 1980s served the relatively modest purpose of relating data from two technologies (PET for imaging 'function' and MRI for imaging 'anatomy'), became ambitious frameworks for integrating the various fields of neuroscience and for solving the crisis defined in the reports for the Decade of the Brain. The documents setting out the HBP formulate interdisciplinarity and overload as information problems: once knowledge is translated into a common, digital language, the subdisciplines of neuroscience will have generated their neuroinformatics solution. Interdisciplinarity and integration become a question of translation -a common strategy of modern techno-science. 42 The HBP acknowledges that such translation will require neuroscientists to cooperate in the creation of standard data formats and common languages for the various areas of the neurosciences, and that will represent a major challenge. 43 But . . . ordering of data across multiple disciplines is not simply a question of finding a commonly accepted set of spatial and temporal units and naming conventions -though this is the way that it is often portrayed in the literature. 44 A description from a textbook on brain mapping hints at the way these changes are implemented in the development of new atlases:
. . . databases will develop in which N-dimensional attribute lists will exist for each voxel in the human brain. 45 Voxels, a neologism derived from the slightly older pixel (picture element), are then to be found in the brain? In a neuroinformatics context, yes. . . These atlases, it is predicted, will contain any number of types of data (ndimensions) and these will be integrated in a digital tool (as voxels). Any kind of information, be it physiological or anatomical, can therefore be attributed to a particular voxel in the brain, all data being translatable into a similar format. This approach constitutes an important shift in neuroscience, where types of data (be they measurements of electrical activity, of cell-types, of sizes of structures, of chemical activity) about the brain have been the province of particular sub-disciplines, and gathered in particular formats (drawings, quantitative measurements, individual maps, scans). Yet, in these new techniques, these various types of knowledge are being juxtaposed and integrated into large digital tools. If the problem is one of information, this suggests that information technology can provide a 'fix'. Yet, it seems that information technology is instead quick to play tricks on those expectations of universal translation. Consider the following transformations that accompany the digitalization of atlases. From serving as reference tools, atlases carry a number of functions. These are meant to . . . provide a structural framework in which individual brain maps can be integrated. 46 Data from individuals will also be related to the information contained in atlases; ideally, not only types of data will be bridged, but also different levels, from the more abstract generalization to the individual case. The atlases built in the course of the project therefore take on new shapes.
Indeed, I have been describing these resources as 'atlases'. But labels do not come easily. Neuroscientists themselves, in turn, celebrate or struggle against the collapse of terms that define traditional categories of reference works. Here are just two examples:
Modern digital maps, however, have become databases [since they can be queried].
. . . all data such [sic] transformed constitute a human brain database. . .
[and] such a database is already under development, based on a recently developed and continuously updating brain atlas. 47 Traditional distinctions between atlas, model and database collapse. This collapse is related to the structures of these resources, which become more fluid because their digital format allows different types of data to be abstracted easily from gathered scans. But even though digitality explodes representational possibilities, not all and any are equally acceptable, as will be demonstrated below -these shifts are the result of technical possibilities coupled to evolving conventions, not of the original essence of the technology.
While it is difficult to know what to call these new tools, since they blur the boundaries between traditional types of reference works, they function nevertheless as authoritative repositories of information. As such, they continue to play one of the traditional rôles of atlases. Atlases, be they geographical or medical, have been used as educational aids and as reference works providing objective knowledge. 48 If objectivity has characterized these types of resources, the concept may be a useful handle to compare the traditional form and function of these, and the possible changes brought about by the new neuroinformatics versions of atlases. As they take on a new digital form and are built to contain many types of information, they also become differently authoritative. In the course of developing a technologically supported basis for integrating knowledge, 'objectivity' is translated into a new context and undergoes significant transformations.
The Average Brain: ICBM 305
In the 1980s, the Talairach atlas, a paper atlas originally developed for neurosurgery, came into common use in the brain-imaging community. As noted above, it served to provide an anatomical reference for the functional data visible on PET scans, so that 'maps' of activations in the brain could be derived. There were several attempts to improve various aspects of the atlas, so that it would provide a better anatomical basis for analysing PET scans. One of the groups involved in this effort was the Brain Imaging Centre (Evans group) at the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI). As a leading centre for neurosurgery and neuropsychology, issues of localization in the brain were important for both their research and their clinical purposes. A better reference tool would enable PET activation results to better be targeted to the anatomy of a given patient, or of groups of subjects taking part in an experiment. In the late 1980s, a digital brain atlas, built to represent the 'average brain', was developed by Evans and his colleagues. 49 While these improvements were meant to answer the needs articulated by researchers, and by clinicians to a certain extent, the approaches developed were also closely tied to the growing availability of scanning and computer technologies. Rather than being based on drawings or photographs of post-mortem brains, MRI scans of living brains could be used to create this average brain atlas. 50 In the early 1990s, the MNI joined two other groups which, in the course of the preceding decade, had also been involved in efforts to improve localization tools for brain mapping. UCLA, the MNI, and the University of Texas Health Science Centre at San Antonio (UTHSCSA) formed the International Consortium for Brain Mapping (ICBM), so as to place a bid for funds in the Human Brain Project. Together, in 1993, they received a grant in the first round of the HBP. 51 These groups shared the view that standardizing and automating, at least partly, some aspects of PET data analysis was desirable, and all three had put forth suggestions in publications.
In forming the Consortium, the scope of the average anatomical atlas grew even larger than the basis developed by Evans, and the MNI brain, based on MRI scans of 'normal subjects', was expanded from a few dozens (in 1989) to 305, with a goal of 450 (150 from each site) to be achieved by the end of 1998. 52 The intermediate version of the average brain, the '305 version' was composed of young right-handed normals, 239 males and 66 females, mean age 23.4. 53 In this atlas, the data were derived from a sample of normal brains, which are the brains of normal subjects. Once selected, demographic, historical, clinical and neuropsychological data, as well as DNA samples, were obtained for each subject. 54 These subjects were then scanned with MRI, and these scans were averaged in Talairach space (a Cartesian space where every location is known through an x, y, z address). This average brain effectively constituted a new target brain (to which other brains could be transformed), and therefore served as a reference for identifying locations of activations when performing PET studies.
In building this atlas, an improved representation of the brain depended on the use of a better sample. The target brain of the original Talairach atlas, to which all other brains were to be related, was felt to be too idiosyncratic since, as the criticism goes, it represents 'a single hemisphere of a single brain belonging to a 60-year-old French woman'. The Talairach atlas was said to lack representativity because the subjects of PET/functional imaging studies were usually normal young adults. 55 A better, more objective atlas was to be a more representative one, using more representative brains.
FIGURE 2 Various Aspects of One Method for Transforming Brains to a Target Brain in a Standard Space
These are the ICBM atlas transformations, which make the brain scan data conform to a standard space. These transformations remove differences between brains that are considered incidental to the scanning session (angle of the head while lying in the scanner), or uninteresting (size, shape), and bring brains into a common space where they can be compared. Source: Reproduced from Mazziotta et al., op. cit. note 50, 289.
The normality of these subjects is based on what could be called a 'negative' definition of normality -that is to say, subjects are normal if they are untraumatized, unmedicated, unaddicted, non-diabetic, not pregnant, and not having had neurosurgery, psychiatric or neurological disorders. This kind of sample is sometimes called 'supernormal', because it eliminates so many of the features found in a 'normal' population. These criteria mean that a highly selective mechanism is at work here. Selection is not ordered by the explicitly disciplined randomization that dominates attempts by the social sciences to achieve ideals of representativity. 56 On the one hand, the claim to normality is instead based on exclusion. Normals are the mirror images of (clinical) populations that might putatively be studied with the atlas. On the other hand, these criteria also embed a number of neuroscientific concepts into the atlas, so that selection criteria themselves could be analysed as representing concepts that have evolved in the past centuries, and have at times been heavily contested (the relevance of handedness, for example). 57 These features seem rather ordinary, and perhaps hardly worth mentioning, until one tries to think, first of all, of what is not encoded (being insured, or not, for health care; high or low economic status; living in urban or rural environments; and so on), and second, it is important to recognize just why these categories are banal. They seem so ordinary because of their pervasiveness across so many systems of classification. Here, however, these classifications become even more meaningful as the brain sciences are playing an increasingly important rôle in defining notions of self: databases become the sites of convergence of features of the brain; 58 kinds of brains match kinds of people along the lines of these converging categories, with potentially normative consequences. (I expand on this theme in the Conclusions.)
Automation and Standardization in the Average Brain
In order to use more than one brain to produce an atlas, a way of averaging the various scans had to be developed. Improvement of the atlas by using an average of many brains rather than a single specimen relied on the possibility of developing better algorithms for comparing brains, for bringing them together in a similar space. Incidental differences in brain size, shape, and position in the scanner needed to be overcome, to leave only what researchers considered the real anatomical differences to be averaged (see Figure 2 ). The use of multiple individuals was not new: Korbinian Brodmann used several specimens to make his famous map of areas in the brain, as did many of the scientists studied by Susan Leigh Star. 59 Even the possibility of comparing across individuals was not entirely new to neuroscience research. But certainly, averaging on this scale, and automating this process, are ideals that are associated with digital technologies.
Both elements meant to improve these atlases (the use of a larger sample and the development of better algorithms) were incorporated into atlas-making through the use of digital tools at nearly every step of the process. Digitized 'interfaces' were built to handle subject data in an automated and standardized way, which helped streamline the information gathering about subjects to be included in the atlas. In terms of imaging data, while the 'slices' in the Talairach atlas varied in thickness, scans were made with a greater regularity, according to standardized protocols. Once placed in a Cartesian space, the anatomy of the brain could be manipulated in terms of voxels, as a set of numerical values placed in a matrix, opening the door to a wide range of mathematical and statistical processes. Scans could be handled automatically by computers as digital files, and because of this possibility of using computers, algorithms to transform brains of different shapes and sizes could also be multiplied beyond what was possible for 'manual' operations by an embodied user relying on pencil-and-ruler transformations.
Not only the degree of standardization and automation is important here, but also the way digital tools were implemented. ICBM decided to develop an automated way to average scans across a group representing a population, a move that is telling of this group's alignment to the larger goals of the HBP described above. In contrast, a comparable atlas, also meant to improve the reference 'target brain', has used a very homogeneous sample (super-normal, right-handed Scandinavian males). Rather than averaging scans on a pixel-by-pixel basis, this group has chosen a set of anatomical landmarks to match brains to each other. 60 An operator had to identify these anatomical landmarks manually and visually, so that comparisons between brains in this atlas are based on homology of structures (the matching of significant anatomical areas), rather than on quantitative averages of voxels (which are meaningless, other than representing a quantity, a light or dark spot in a scan). For groups participating in the HBP, fully automated and standardized manipulations of scans, and the consequent freedom from the requirement for embodied expertise, were priorities. 61 The criteria for selecting an adequate sample for this new atlas are also linked to the HBP. The Report leading up to the Human Brain Project had recommended gathering baseline information about subjects in a standard way: age, handedness, sex, education level, or any characteristic features of the subject of group. 62 The procedures for dealing with subjects further integrated the goals of standardization and uniformity of the HBP into the atlas of the Consortium; a program called NeuroCog was developed as an 'automated subject interview interface'. 63 All subjects were therefore 'entered' into the database in a standardized and automated way, in the hope of reducing human error and making the process uniform.
Finally, the list of attributes with which each component of the sample is marked takes on a particular significance in relation to the digital format of the atlas. In this respect, these atlases are more open-ended and less rigid than paper atlases, since sub-populations can be extracted, based on age, 64 gender, race, behavioural abilities, handedness, or other features for which the data have been marked. 65 That is to say that, in principle, the atlas could be queried to produce an average older female brain, or an average uneducated left-handed brain. Each feature for which the sample is marked can therefore be related to the data contained in the atlas, depending on the perceived relevance of these features to current research agendas. These features are made into differences that (could) make a difference in understanding the brain.
The flexible, multi-levelled structure of these atlases therefore relies on the possibility of comparing brain scans automatically, and of building an atlas based on scans transformed to a standardized space, and marked in standardized ways for certain features of a population. These transformations are possible because of the investments made in developing and automating new digital technologies.
A New Object in the Average Brain Atlas
Besides the possibility of creating a new average brain to serve as a framework for integrating PET and MRI data, the expanded MNI atlas resulted in new ways of seeing the brain -in terms of its variability. The Committee's task force had raised the development of a new atlas showing variability; while variability between individuals was known to exist, it was generally acknowledged to be 'unknown', in the sense of 'not measured precisely'. 66 A call to action regarding this issue was published in the early 1990s, and interest in variability seems to have grown in importance since the 1970s with the development of the use of CT scanning and postmortem co-relations of hemispheric functional differentiation. I suspect that this interest was always greater in surgical contexts, but was dealt with as a matter of expertise and clinical judgement, rather than as an issue requiring quantification. There seems to have been some resurgence of interest in anatomical differences between individuals as more attention was also paid to anatomical differentiation in the brain in general. For example, in the 1970s, when functional asymmetries were investigated, there were speculations that these would also be significant when observed between individuals:
Since there are great individual differences in the extent of asymmetries, it will be important to investigate whether these correlate with individual differences in functions. 67 The extent of variability becomes highly visible in the averaged brain. Once brains are transformed into a standard space, 'true' variability in the structure of the organ itself is preserved, while anatomical differences considered irrelevant are eliminated (as mentioned above, differences that 'don't matter', such as size, are factored out by making the digitized scans conform to the same space.) The average brain therefore focuses attention on the cortex as the seat of (significant) variability between brains. When the voxels in the scans are averaged, areas of greater variability are blurred, while in areas of lesser variability, the image is sharper than it would be in an individual scan (see Figure 3) .
The average brain is therefore the simultaneous creation of a better reference space representative of a population, and a visualization of variability. As a reference tool it is considered more reliable because of its greater representativity, based on an average, a norm:
Landmarks are derived from inter-subject stability of structures, rather than by simple assignment based on the anatomical features of a single brain. 68 While the digital context of these atlases is novel, the notion that averaged images produce better landmarks is curiously close to early efforts to harness the potential for mechanical objectivity of the camera. Statistical thinking has traditionally insisted that features of interest that are truly important can be generalized across cases, and therefore identified. Compare the rationale of the average brain above, to Galton's description of the principle of his 'pictorial statistics':
Composite pictures are. . . much more than averages; they are rather the equivalents of those large statistical tables whose totals, divided by the number of cases and entered on the bottom line, are the averages. They are real generalizations, because they include the whole of the material under consideration. The blur of their outlines, which is never great in truly generic composites, except in unimportant details, measure the tendency of individuals to deviate form the central type. 69 Note how the process of pictorial statistics making removes the idiosyncratic, an argument also made in the averaging of brain activation scans, in favour of the common stable features (see Figure 4) . If atlases had traditionally shown the characteristic and the individual, in the sense of Daston and Galison, knowing the brain across subjects is now a newly prominent feature of brain atlases. I will later show how the two datastructures overlap in some respects and differ in others, in the production of their respective pictorial and digital qualities.
Since the mid-1990s, brain-mapping researchers have adopted the MNI average brain as a template on which to locate activations. It also serves as the template in 'SPM96', a data analysis package, making it the reference brain of a majority of functional imaging studies. 70 What had begun as a better tool for localization of PET activity (a better target brain based on a larger, normal sample) became an exploration of the normal brain, and of its variability, and the standard baseline reference with which to report findings. The requirements for a more authoritative, objective brain (through use of large sample) coupled to the favoured technique of objectivity (standardization and automation) are productive of new objects, new standards and baselines adaptable in new ways. A number of digital tools interact to produce and organize knowledge. The average brain therefore came to provide a more authoritative reference from which to know the brain, by digitizing, standardizing and automating comparisons between brains. Through these comparisons, variability, as a new element of brain anatomy, literally came into view. The possibility of querying the atlas and extracting sub-populations was also established through the automated collection of standard information about subjects.
One Earth, Many Brains: Shifting from Average to Probabilistic Atlases
The creation of an average brain, which shows variability, was not the end point for the Consortium. ICBM researchers paid increasing attention to variability as an object of study in its own right. ICBM thus formulated a new critique of average atlases, and thereby a rationale for developing a new atlas. The merging of maps was acknowledged as important, but limited to a qualitative rendering of variability. 71 Around 1995, a new metaphor was appearing in print to explain the complexity and necessity of understanding variability in a probabilistic way. Members of the Consortium compared the problem of cerebral cartography with that of terrestrial cartography: there is only one earth, one physical reality, but many brains, so that the cerebral reality needs to be based on a large sample and account for variability within that sample. But if the average brain atlas could show some aspects of variability, variability could best be reported probabilistically. 72 That is to say that a quantitative evaluation of variability was deemed more desirable than its visual rendition in the average brain. The ICBM therefore developed another type of atlas, as researchers addressed variability in increasingly complex ways. They aimed to quantify it, and improve on what was perceived as too qualitative a demonstration of variability. This move to 'recover' variability as measurable, and not simply to 'picture' it, was born out of the tensions between a pictorial rendition of variability and a measurable quantifiable one, and led to further novel applications for atlases and digital tools.
Average Brains and Probable Labels: New Relations between Data
In the course of developing the average atlas, researchers had become very proficient in the manipulation of 'pixels' and 'voxels' in brain scans. In the average brain, these were 'registered', disciplined into a standard space, and their value automatically calculated. That is to say that their value, corresponding to a degree of darkness or brightness on a grey scale, was averaged. Further work at the MNI enabled the group to label voxels in scans for other types of features -namely, to label the type of tissue represented, or an anatomical region. In one project, a trained operator (usually a neuroanatomist) 'painted' the scans of one hundred brains with a pixel-wide 'paintbrush', identifying and labelling (segmenting) each area.
Another layer of information was therefore constructed around the scans. Not only could voxels be averaged with other voxels, but the relation of a labelled voxel to other labelled voxels could also be measured. This relation was rendered not only quantitatively, but also as a probability:
. . . a probability map is then constructed for each segmented structure, by determining the proportion of subjects assigned a given anatomic label at each voxel position in the stereotaxic [reference] space. 73 This kind of atlas indicates that, based on the sample of brain scans processed, at location x, y, z, there is a 56% probability of finding structure A, a 13% probability of finding structure B, a 6% probability of finding structure C, and so on. This means that locations in a brain scan, placed in a reference space, could be known as having a probability of belonging to a certain anatomical structure. When reporting activations from functional imaging studies, the anatomical area corresponding to the functional area could therefore be described with degrees of certainty. While human interventions (usually those of a neuroanatomist), and their dreaded inconsistencies, were involved in some of the labelling for these atlases, the need to standardize labelling between observers, and ideally to remove the observer, were clear concerns of the Consortium, as will be described below.
This work also extended the technologically mediated understanding of variability of the brain, and reshaped a number of neuroanatomical concepts. The structure of data in these atlases, and the manipulations of digital technologies, give rise to new concepts and new ways of knowing the brain. Anatomy, in the paper atlases, was the correspondence of a label to a structure, a relation of identity. Structures are here defined according to their 'occurrence' in a data set. Like the average brain, this too is a new representation, clearly different from traditional understandings of neuroanatomy. Whereas in the classic anatomic atlases, the goal is to identify the structure to which a location in the brain of a given individual brain belongs as unequivocally as possible, here, locations in the brain are defined in terms of a representation that stands for a population. This understanding is not only relative, but also quantified. Rather than visualizing variability, as a more or less blurry area on a representation of averaged scans, this approach provides a quantitative understanding of variability for a population. When recast in terms of a population, across large numbers of scans and in probabilistic terms, relationships between label and structure are relative to a sample, and the identity of a structure becomes a question of probability. This dynamic can also be extended; a voxel can be known for the probability of belonging to a structure, for the probability that it is abnormal, or that sets of voxels represent changes in volumes or structures in the brain.
In this atlas too, the flexibility of digital tools is manifest. Objectivity can be constantly transformed. As each scan is added to the set, the probabilities of the atlas change, so that the statistics improve as more data are incorporated. 74 Quality therefore improves with quantity in this framework. Canguilhem's aphorism, 'the norm points to the rule and extends it', pronounced some 50 years ago, 75 seems extraordinarily appropriate to the conceptual underpinnings of the Probabilistic Atlas. This particular point highlights how these tools must also be considered in terms of their involvements with the way they structure the work of researchers. We have seen how the atlas serves to displace the inconsistent observer, in favour of the more highly valued automation. Yet not all the features of the atlas are desirable. Because atlases are used as baselines for brain-mapping studies, a researcher trying to write a paper doesn't want the localizations about which she is trying to write a coherent story to be a moving target -which is what they literally would be if the probabilities of locations in the atlas were changing with every additional brain scan entered. In practice, scans are not added one by one but rather periodically, so that the atlas, via the interface to users, is 'quarantined', and even periodical changes have to be negotiated with users by the atlas-makers. A copy of the earlier version of the atlas may be kept as a way of accommodating researchers who may still be working on an analysis using that particular version. This is a clear example of how work practices are shaped by these technologies. The negotiations also highlight another aspect of the tensions identified by Bowker, between article and database as sites of knowledge-making -these
FIGURE 5 A Probabilistic Brain Atlas
The data from subjects is pooled, and will enable the evaluation of the probability of a point being located in a particular region, or of being 'normally' located. Such an atlas might be population-based (that is, of schizophrenic brains, etcetera). Source: Reproduced from < http://www.loni.ucla.edu/~thompson/disease_atlases.html > , courtesy of Paul Thompson, UCLA Department of Neurology.
two ways of structuring knowledge sometimes have incompatible timecycles. 76 
Pathological Probabilistic Atlases
If variability between brain structures was quantified in atlases of the normal brain, a similar recasting of notions of pathology also occurred in the probabilistic atlases of disease. Between the early and mid-1990s, as the Consortium work progressed, the MNI developed expertise in the analysis of large numbers of scans, linking various kinds of software into 'analysis pipelines'. These are sets of data-processing tools and analytic procedures in which raw data (scans) are automatically processed. These pipelines were adapted to deal with abnormal brains, thereby linking clinical data (scans of patients) with the lab's analytic procedures. Using these techniques, the MNI has embarked on a commercial venture in partnership with a company that produces scanners, and has formed a company that runs the imaging analysis component of clinical drug trials. 77 Through one such contract, the centre compiled 1850 scans of 460 people with multiple sclerosis (MS), which have been entered into the MNI reference space and processed through analysis pipelines. 78 In being processed through this particular pipeline, voxels are labelled for the type of tissue they represent. For example, in the MNI's trial of drugs for treating multiple sclerosis, brain tissue was labelled according to grey matter, white matter, cerebro-spinal fluid (CSF) or lesioned tissue, instead of being 'painted' according to anatomical labels. 79 This means that the volume occupied by different types of tissue can be automatically calculated across large samples, and in scans taken at different times. Based on the measurement of statistically significant increases or decreases in volumes, these tools have been applied to clinical trials. Pipelines therefore produce quantitative data about the potential decrease of a 'lesion' load, in relation to the administration of a placebo or drug. Differences between scans that would not be evident to the naked eye of the observer become apprehensible through a quantitative analysis. As imaging studies become part of the required evidence in drugs trials, quantification in turn forms the vehicle for a more efficient circulation of knowledge claims. 80 Insofar as all scans must conform to pre-determined parameters in order for the software to operate, this dependence on standardized procedures is a condition for the use of data in these new atlases. Further standardization, beyond the imaging research laboratory, was involved in pursuing these evaluations of clinical brain scans. In this case, scans were not gathered from subjects coming to the lab, but from patients in a number of geographically dispersed clinical settings. In order for 'pipelines' to handle hundreds of scans automatically and analyse them quantitatively, each site must participate in the coordination of scanning. The coordination of work done at these sites required the involvement of a clinical trial manager. He told stories about 'being able to rely on some centres', or knowing which people he could call on when in a crunch and pressed by time. These accounts of how he 'got the job done' in turn relied on developing trust, and the need to visit sites to get to know people -the need for a certain embodied kind of work. Maintaining the system that led to the production of the atlas seems to have required human judgementjudgement perhaps not so different from that of the anatomical illustrator, though displaced to a different point in the production of representations.
Even though imaging would seem a highly technical process, with parameters that can be specified and standardized, and delegated to machines, human relations and interventions were needed to compensate for local variations and to make the data suitable for the pipelines. To rephrase a well-known formula in the light of this case, 'mobiles', especially digital ones, are perhaps not so much 'immutable', 81 as recreated according to conventions, and allowed to circulate in the locales where these conventions are operating. To expand the power of these automated, quantified analyses to address clinical conditions, further standardization and coordination of work in new locations is required, and clearly, face-toface interactions have not entirely been evacuated from this context of work.
A New Object in the Probabilistic Atlas: The Essence of Disease
As in the case of the average brain, which showed variability, the gathering of digital data about MS lesions in the brain also led to the representation of a new scientific object of study. While the company sponsoring the trial was interested in the effects of the drug under trial ('the numbers'), the imaging data remained at the disposal of the MNI. For its own research purposes, the MNI has used the data from these clinical trials to generate the MS brain, a 3D representation that indicates the likelihood of the location of lesions in MS. As a result of new modes of data handling, aggregated scans come to show not the brain of a patient suffering from MS, but rather the image of MS itself. Across scans, across patients, across the clinical manifestations of symptoms, the atlas . . . shows the most likely locations for MS lesions within a population and is a convenient way to distil a large amount of population data into a single entity. 82 This representation of disease is more a synthesis than it is an average. It is the image of disease across cases, in contrast to, say, how the disease might be most likely to appear in a typical case.
This view of disease as concentrated in a single representation has also been used to describe other atlases. One such atlas was built using scans of the brains of schizophrenic patients and normal subjects. This atlas is 'a concise numeric and visual summary of the group as a whole', and the statistically analysed difference between the two is an 'image [that] presents a descriptive picture of the size of group differences'. 83 The essence of disease can be visualized in a scan, as can the essential differences between normal and schizophrenic brains. Again, these new notions of disease are possible when the relevant brain differences can be identified, that is to say, once a standardized digital framework for comparison has been developed.
The atlas shows a refined synthesis, but it is quite different from the 'ideal', as defined by Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison. This version of the ideal, rather than being based on the observers' mental distillation and expert judgements, is the result of a pipeline analysis and a framework for comparing and labelling brain scans. Individual cases are to be distilled, not by judgement of the experienced eye and mind, but by the application of the many automated and mathematically validated tools described above. In early modern medicine, knowledge of the essence of a disease, above and beyond the idiosyncratic manifestation of a disease that could be observed in a patient, was considered part of the physician's abilities. But here, the essence of disease arises when expertise is delegated to objective digital and quantitative manipulations, not to the exercise of judgement, based on reason or experience. In these atlases, the essence of disease arises from the automated, large-scale comparisons of standardized scans.
Furthermore, in terms of traditional anatomical atlases, this atlas points to an important shift from the tendency to show the 'characteristic' representation of a diseased organ, a convention that is especially longstanding in anatomy. 84 Here, however, pathology is constituted as the distribution of lesions as identified through automatic processing across cases, not as observable individual instances.
Further applications for the probabilistic atlas were also being developed during one of my visits to a lab, and give insight into the importance of avoiding observer intervention in the construction of the automated processing of brain scans. Analysis software to identify some of the sulci ('valleys' in the cortex) from MRI scans was being developed and validated. The software currently identifies the probability that a fold corresponds to a given structure, the central sulcus for example, and the goal is ideally to be able to identify the desired structure on a given subject's scan. As in the other atlases, the algorithms are validated manually, a tedious and time-consuming job, requiring not only neuroanatomical training, but (somewhat paradoxically) also the ability to learn to see with the display programs which handle these images.
But, while tedious, this work is done with the understanding that manual (or visual!) validation will confirm the results of the automated tool, and thus liberate future users from the need to 'paint' the structures manually, and ensure the mechanical objectivity of the process. While human intervention may sometimes be needed in practice, the ideals pursued are those of automation and standardization; students and researchers working on these tools usually reported avoiding human inconsistency, or removing the noise of human error as a self-evident motivation for the work. This perceived need to avoid human fallibility was also visible in the instructions and support work provided by the local computer experts to researchers: programming was done with the goal of avoiding 'interaction', and of automating data processing as much as possible. 85 The use of these automated tools therefore relies on the normalization of the process of analysis (assumed after validation), and the 'normality' of scanning procedures and of the brains under scrutiny.
The ideals to which these tools strive consist in removing the individual, both as idiosyncratically ill (MS is defined across a population) and as subjectively (inconsistently) interpreting or manipulating data. This approach produces frameworks and models of the brain based on purified data, which have undergone disciplined transformations so as to yield an idealized object. What is also new, therefore, is the type of empirical instances that are favoured.
If certain kinds of entities and certain kinds of context are being excluded from entering into the databases we are creating, and those entities and contexts share the feature that they are singular in space and time, then we are producing a set of models of the world which -despite its frequent historicity -is constraining us generally to converge on descriptions of the world in terms of repeatable entities: not because the world is so, but because this is the nature of our data structures. 86 These atlases thus correspond to privileging, in Daston and Galison's terms, the ideal or the average, at the expense of the typical or characteristic.
Variability (Diagnostic) Atlases
The development of these atlases is clearly one of gradual shifts in the manipulations of scanning data, rather than one of radical breaks between old and new endeavours. Building on the average and labelled probabilistic approach, another type of atlas has been developed by the Consortium. The norms that are established by the representations discussed up to now are built around two concepts: that of the average as a reference for a group; and the possibility of illustrating or determining statistical probabilities for features of a group. But the projects of the Consortium are more ambitious than simply providing a better reference tool for the field and, as mentioned above, focus on building a normative model of the human brain with clinical applications. 87 Based on the probabilistic labelling of anatomy in the ICBM project, one of the goals for probabilistic atlases in the HBP is to develop their use as a diagnostic tool:
Such capabilities [of giving probabilities for features] allow for a rigorous analysis of normal variability, as well as variability in structure and/or function as it relates to disease, such as those thought to be associated with mental disorders and other brain pathology. 88 To understand the logic of this atlas, it is useful to think again of the single voxel being manipulated. In this atlas, the measurements made around this voxel concern its relation in space to other voxels. Specifically, this means that the direction and distance a pixel has to be 'moved' to be aligned with a given position is measured. This provides a variability map, which shows by how much a given voxel can vary.
So whereas the average scans showed variation as an aggregate of anatomy of many brains, in this kind of atlas, variability is to be understood statistically, as a feature of the brain that can indicate normality or pathology in a single brain. In order to evaluate a particular case, the reference space must still take into account the normal range of variation: '. . . any comparison of individual against normative data must still account for anatomical variability among individuals, particularly in cortical folding'. 89 The differences between the subject's scans and those in the atlas must then be quantified and determined to fall inside or outside the normal range.
The proposed probabilistic atlases will relate a new subject's MRI to each and every brain in the archive by warping the new brain to the archived ones. The structures are then compared as to their distribution, and a probability is issued, to determine the likelihood that the new subject's data falls within the configuration of the archived brains. Two types of representations can be made from this atlas, either 'variability maps', based on a group or population, or 'probability maps', indicating the relationship of one individual to this group.
The particular manipulations of the voxel here, like in the preceding atlas, involved being brought into a standard space and labelled as belonging to a particular structure, or occupying a particular volume. A further layer of information is added in these atlases: for a given group, the distribution of voxels in space for a structure is further calculated (see Figure 7 ). This provides a variability map, in which the normal range of distribution for a brain structure is given as a coloured representation, with 'hotter' colours representing greater variability. In keeping with the concept of variability developed from the previous atlases, some areas like the cortex have a greater range (hot colours) than areas that are more stable across subjects (cool colours). Comparing a subject's scan to the probability map produces a second representation. The individual's scan is therefore colour-coded according to whether voxels fall within the normal range (cool colours) or else represent a deviation from this range, and probably represent a pathological variation (hot colours). A number of variations on this basic principle exist, so that volumes, changes in location, or the shape of particular structures, can be compared in this way, depending on the aspects of the brain that are deemed of interest clinically. In the logic of these atlases, each of those interests can be translated into a particular kind of manipulation and measurement of the brain as a set of voxels.
The significant step taken in the constitution and proposed use of this atlas is that the individual scan is only meaningful in terms of the probabilistic atlas. The individual scan becomes a valuable piece of information once it has been 'overlaid' with the significance that comparison to the norm imparts to it. Normality emerges from large-scale, quantitative comparisons, and analysis based on voxel-to-voxel comparisons can provide a picture of a disease, where no typical pattern was visible:
FIGURE 7 Probability and Variability Maps
These images are hard to reproduce and best seen as a three-D representation on a colour monitor, but basically, you can see an image of a patient's brain (bottom) compared to a population in terms of variability of the brain (top). Where a voxel falls outside the normal probability for that part of the brain, it would appear in red -the traditional colour of alarm. The goal is to be able to associate patterns of abnormal variation in specific patients, with particular conditions (Alzheimer's, schizophrenia, and so on). In the future, precise models for the cortex that encode information on structural variability will provide a better understanding of the complex regional changes that occur as a result of developmental processes or under pathological conditions. Accurate quantitative measurements may then be used to obtain objective criteria for conditions such as global or regional cerebral atrophy and for the assessment of subtle gyral or sulcal anomalies that may be specific to certain disease states. 90 This atlas can handle scans in their typical, clinical form (as images), since it is built using pattern recognition principles. This feature might significantly further the clinical application of the atlas, since the visual qualities of these digital scans are important elements in making them 'fit' the kind of evidence preferred in the clinical context. 91 The ICBM plans to pursue a probabilistic approach to the brain for other levels of brain anatomy and function. The goals of the researchers for integrating other levels of data are parallel to those developed around anatomical data -a new paradigm for developing tools of brain exploration has emerged.
Based on ideals of large-scale automated data gathering and data analysis, these anatomical atlases, be they average, probabilistic or deformation-based, have provided new tools for manipulating and comparing brain scans. These are constitutive and representative of the particular ideals of objectivity of ICBM and the HBP. All the relations of voxels to structures, and to the normal range of variations, are thoroughly quantified, and objectivity further guaranteed by the use of statistical tools that test these relationships. These tools have also been the context for the production of new objects of scientific knowledge: the average 'normal' and 'sick' brain, the variable brain and the probabilistic brain. Finally, and directly in relation to the HBP, atlases have provided idealized brains as frameworks for integrating data across technologies and populations.
Totalizing Atlases
In terms of the larger goals of the HBP, the average brain has therefore become a reference space that can be used to integrate many other types of data. The UCLA component of the Consortium has gathered digital images of post-mortem tissue (which provide better resolution than MRI) that will be matched to the reference space. In principle, other types of data can be integrated as well, adding a functional level and elaborating functional landmarks. Plans for the next five years of funding involve establishing two more probabilistic levels. Cytoarchitectonic data (at the level of brain cells) will be gathered, and the variability of the brain's anatomy will be defined on the level of distribution of biochemicals (and receptors at cell level), which have a functional component. This will serve to link gross anatomy to the level of cellular function, as well as to data from PET and EEG studies of function. 92 The Consortium describes the integration of these data as likely to lead to an understanding of the correlation of function and anatomy, one of the general goals of the Human Brain Project.
We make no assumptions about the relationship between structure and functions in the human brain, at either a macro-or microscopic level, except to state the obvious, that these relationships are complex and poorly understood. Further, we are not proposing that we will unravel this complexity with the data collected in the context of the consortium program. The development of a probabilistic reference system and atlas for the human brain simply provides the framework in which to place these ever-accumulating data sets in a fashion that allows them to be related to one another and that begins to provide insights into the relationship between micro-and macroscopic structure and function. 93 What began as a repository of anatomical data, a brain more representative because based on multiple subjects, has become a framework for integrating many levels of data and articulating relationships between them. How this cross-disciplinary integration will work will be an interesting question in this next stage of development of the atlas, as ICBM expands its atlases, and as the HBP's various grantees attempt to integrate the resources developed under its aegis. Bowker notes that it is never a simple case of 'nesting' (of various timelines into a biodiversity resource) and that this process always involves concessions on the part of one or the other system of classification, to the dominant one. 94 One can wonder whether the researchers do not protest too much about this lack of assumption regarding a key question in neuroscience. Frameworks are not neutral, and this one places brain mapping at its centre.
Conclusion
As we have seen in the discussion of specific atlases above, complex representational strategies can distil individual features to form average brains and make these into a highly-valued representation, warranted by the stabilities across the multiple instances they represent (average atlases). They can also embrace these differences and render them as exquisitely as possible for each individual (probability atlases). In light of these developments, earlier atlases are accused of being highly observer-dependent, of using purely qualitative measures, and of being based on 'pure visual inspection'. As such, researchers claim that they do not allow generalizations, due to the large variations in extent and topology between individual brains -as opposed to what the developers of atlases, such as the ICBM, claim the digital tools can do. But these current judgements are based on a new set of criteria that arise with the development of neuroinformatics, which foster large-scale sampling and automated processing -remote from the individual as embodied object or subject.
Quantification, standardization and automation are embedded in pipelines and computerized tools. These are all elements that shape and sustain the objectivity towards which these atlases strive. The removal of human interference and mathematization of observations in scientific practice has been noted before. 95 What is new in these atlases is the extent to which these ideals are taken, as pipelines guide the entire trajectory of data, from gathering, to analysis, to the representation of results. Large-scale sampling has become possible with scanners and informatics tools, so that typical or ideal representations are no longer considered suitable for these atlases. Furthermore, ever increasing quantity seems to hold the answer. Atlases therefore have 'an open data structure for any future enlargement of the sample size'. 96 The quality of the representation of the brain is relative to the sample gathered, improving proportionately to the sample size, while also being open to qualification in terms of features of a subset of the sampled population.
A New Digital Objectivity?
I will return to the interaction of these many processes later, but first, I wish to draw out the specificities of digital objectivity in these atlases. Two elements, not raised by Daston and Galison in their discussion of paper atlases, seem typical of these digital resources: the combination of types of techniques of objectivity in dealing with images; and the extension of objectivity to the use of the atlas. Their absence from the discussion of paper atlases is at least partly due to the fact that they grow in prominence when atlases are in a digital format.
First, the digital format of the data that are incorporated in these atlases contrasts with the optical use of images for creating atlases. When these atlases are compared to earlier projects based on images, the extent to which quantification and automation, as associated with the digital, play a rôle in this type of objectivity is further highlighted. The project of using the power of the photographic image pursued by Galton and his contemporaries overlaps in important ways with the goals of these atlases. For example, in the latter part of the 19th century, attempts were made to archive and use images (especially photographs) for scientific purposes. 97 Some of these efforts are quite similar to the goals of the digital atlases described above: to go from the idiosyncrasy of the individual representation to the elucidation of the 'type' through multiple comparisons, involving a merger of optics and statistics. 98 The images produced by Galton are perhaps best known, but form only one of several projects of archival control of, and through, photography in the fields of medicine and law. 99 In order to deal with large amounts of data, Galton chose to collapse the archive into the photograph and capture the 'type', while Bertillon incorporated the photograph in the archive, to capture the individual. 100 This tension between the revelation of phenomena across instances, and the identification of a particular (deviant) instance from large amounts of data, is also found in the new brain atlases. In the multiple sclerosis and schizophrenia atlas, the disease and its progress are invisible in a single case, but can be apprehended across many scans. With variability maps, the focus is rather on identifying the individual, in relation to the archived data. Emphasis is placed on overcoming the individual variations, so that the essence of disease arises, or on seeking out that very individuality -in ways similar to the efforts based on photographs.
Yet the digital form of scans plays an important rôle which should not be underestimated, and which comes into view when this comparison is pursued to the level of the manipulation of the data. The digital form differentiates the new brain atlases from Galton's and Bertillon's efforts based on the optical form of the photograph, because the image itself is open to further quantification. If the classification of photographs was frustrated by the 'messy contingency' and the sheer quantity of available photographs, 101 in the case of scans, digitality holds the promise of tighter control of the very content of scans as data. 102 While the objectivity of the photograph relies on the mechanical objectivity provided by the camera in making the image, the objectivity of scans further involves their digital format; the contents of the image are considered thoroughly quantifiable. The cumulative objectivity of the brain atlas does not reside in imagistic effects, but in the bits of numerical data it contains.
A second contrast between paper and digital atlases concerns the use of atlases, once they have been created. With the paper atlas, the scientist wishing to use the atlas must infer from the representations it contains, and relate what is learned to the individual specimen encountered. While Daston and Galison do not describe this process explicitly, they seem to assume that it is mental, probably acquired as part of a learning process. 103 In the case of the new brain atlases, the objectivity built into these also concerns their use; ideally, individual data are to be automatically compared to the representations in the atlas, a process also supported by a statistical and quantitative logic. Consider this new definition of the success of an atlas:
The success of any brain atlas depends on how well the anatomy of individual subjects match the representation of anatomy in the atlas. 104 Here, the comparison between an atlas and a new case to be evaluated is based on matching, on the possibility of 'warping' one brain to another automatically, and of evaluating this match with a degree of certainty or a quantitative evaluation of 'fit'.
Whereas the traditional atlas is heuristic, and the observer (surgeon or anatomist) must make a judgement call in applying her knowledge, in the new digital atlases this process is automated. Rather than being based on an embodied judgement, the new atlases are used to produce automatically a degree of certainty as to the identity of a given voxel's location. This is further expressed explicitly as a quantitative probability, a degree of confidence about the way a reference work and the individual case are related. Not only is the variability in the performance of the human observer done away with, but these atlases also offer the possibility of quantifying the experimental error -a feature that is also stressed as an advantage of these new atlases. 105 Part of the reason for this shift might be the reconfiguration in the digital context of the subject/object relation, which Daston and Galison posit as the defining axis for understanding objectivity. The automated evaluation built into these atlases, what I have termed 'database diagnosis', 106 might further indicate the extent to which the pole of the 'subject' has been diminished in this context. 107 The observer hardly appears at all in digitalized work based on a virtual object (such as the normal brain of these atlases), and when she does, it is then only to test the pipelines, not the accuracy of the transformations -for which there are other automated testing methods. In a sense, both changes (the extension of standardization and automation to the contents of the image and to the use of the atlas) are part of the same pursuit. The subjective elements of the earlier atlases, described in recent texts as purely qualitative, and purely visual, are also purely dismissible, in light of the HBP's antithetical purity of standards and automation.
Digital Objectivity and Cyberscience
Rather than linger on this further episode in the death of the observer, I would like to take this analysis one step further and ask what this mode of objectivity might mean for the practice of science. The rationale for Daston and Galison's exploration is the need to refine definitions of objectivity, so as to have a coherent debate about whether science is objective. Their contribution is therefore a historicization of the concept, and an illustration of its varying guises. They also point out that while various modes of objectivity may co-exist, one or the other tends to dominate during certain periods, as tools and ways of practising science change. One way of explaining this dominance can be described by what Geoffrey Bowker and Leigh Star, in their study of classification systems, have termed 'convergence'. Convergence is the process by which representations and the world come to resemble each other. Furthermore, Bowker and Star note that classification systems are often invisible, because they are 'naturalized' into routines of life. The same goes for atlases -by studying the progressive development of atlases, and the negotiations that occur as these tools encounter new disciplines where they are neither natural nor routine, this convergence is somewhat more visible because more tentative. Convergence makes for strong accounts of the world, however, when there is a rapprochement of standards, categories and technologies in large-scale information infrastructures. 108 Let me expand on how convergence might operate when large-scale information structures are digitized and available through electronic media. First of all, the digital form and structure of these atlases provide an interface in which a variety of techniques of objectivity converge and reinforce each other. Along with the mechanical objectivity of scanning and imaging technologies, these atlases are constituted through the mobilization of computer-supported statistical and quantitative apparatus, which provide a further mechanism for validation and for guaranteeing objectivity. The powers of the undeviating and tireless machine are multiplied in these atlases, through being coupled to a statistical and quantitative armamentarium. 109 As we saw in our earlier discussion of the average brain as the 'new' normal brain, the possibility of correlating scans is inseparable form the development of standardized parameters for making these comparisons. The gathering of large samples is made possible by the development of conventions, the standardization of formats, and by automated procedures based on digital technologies and techniques -these atlases have 'no printon-paper' equivalent. 110 Scans gather added value by virtue of their being mobilized in a Latourian sense, while quantification, analysis and evaluation of data, accomplished automatically, are taken to guarantee their integrity as data. The reference tool becomes the site of discovery, as new knowledge emerges from compilations and comparisons, as scans become more easily available, and as methods for compiling and comparing them automatically are developed. It is now clear how the collapse of the traditional definitions of atlases with which researchers grapple comes about -maps, databases, atlases and scans are all made to translate, to move from one format to the next. This is also the source of their 'power': each level of information can be cascaded into the next. 111 There may be something particular about the kind of science pursued with these techniques and technologies that can be coupled in a digital resource, and about the way the various objects that make up the database merge and blur so as to appear seamless. I will make one last incursion into the case of ICBM's work to illustrate what I mean by this convergence, and to show how digital objectivity might be significant for the characterization of cyberscience.
Neuroscience Saved?
The notion of convergence is also useful in elaborating how digital objectivity might be significant for the production of knowledge, not only at the level of objects of knowledge and techniques, but also in terms of how new projects of discovery might be formulated. At the beginning of this paper, I evoked two key issues from discussions in the Decade of the Brain: the brain as a set of voxels known in n-dimensions; and the crisis of information in neuroscience. Both issues are part of new modes of data acquisition and handling, as described in this paper, through a specific objective formulation and comparisons of 'the normal' in various forms. To return to the rhetoric of the Decade of the Brain: What will save neuroscience? The answer, in a single neologism, is 'neuroinformatics' -which, as we have seen, comes to stand for many new conventions, tools and practices in neuroscience. But it should also be clear, after discussing the new atlases, that, in being saved, neuroscience will also be born again.
In these new atlases, ideals of integration are given form, and the effects of new approaches and new digital tools on the kind of knowledge produced become clear. The resources described in this paper all have in common the use of large-scale sampling and analysis, and the redefinition of representations of the normal brain. These common features point to the intersection of two important themes in the constitution of atlases as digital resources. First, these tools are the materialization of the 'needs' of neuroscience to develop ways of pooling data. Second, they reinforce the notion that advancing knowledge about the brain, and distinguishing normal brains from pathological ones, is only possible when using large amounts of pooled data. In turn, the means selected and developed to achieve this pooling in the HBP resources have focused on the use of digital and electronic media.
By comparing Figure 1 and Figure 8 , one gets a sense of the conceptual and technical work that has taken place in the course of the HBP. Figure 8 shows simple dotted lines between various types of data. Integration between disciplines is a matter of translating the various versions of the brain they produce. Living and dead brains are also to be correlated in this atlas; the effects of death erased by a proper algorithmic correction. These translations are possible when data is made into a feature of a voxel, this voxel constituting a reference space in which different types of data meet.
While they have been discussed here mainly as tools and authoritative references, the new atlases are also meant to fulfil a function as tools for research and discovery: Computerized brain atlases are not only for the identification of structures but are also becoming a research tool for parcelling the human brain functionally and structurally and for meta-analysis of brain function. 112 The importance of notions like 'data-mining' have been emphasized in more recent reports on the HBP. 113 Along with the development of these virtual brains, the locus of neuroscience research can arguably be said to be changing, moving from wet labs to voxel space, from workbench to console and monitor. Similar moves in biology, especially in relation to the Human
FIGURE 8 The Potential of the Integrating Atlas as Proposed by ICBM in 1997
Note the conceptual and technical work that separates this representation of 'integration' from the integration of levels proposed in 1992 (see Figure 1 ). The representation of knowledge has been streamlined; each subdiscipline is a version of the 'same' brain. The relation of these various levels has become defined as one of standardization of formats and of translatability. Source: Mazziotta et al., op. cit. note 50, 291.
Genome Project, have been defined as a paradigm shift in biology. 114 While the efforts in neuroscience are pursued on a smaller scale and arose later than those of the Genome community, there are signs that the atlasing mode of work is having an impact on some research efforts. Perhaps most striking among these is the close, almost synthetic approach of atlasing practices, and of those for running clinical trials. Pharmaceutical companies are especially interested in the 'pipeline' analyses, such as those the MNI can provide, since the companies can easily perform 'audits' of the results provided: automated manipulations are easily recorded and verified. The manner in which authoritative, trustworthy results are produced in ICBM, and the standards to which pharmaceutical companies must answer, are very compatible.
But such close collaboration is not restricted to projects that might be expected to have a more 'bureaucratic' set up. Bodies dedicated to the pursuit of scientific research, like the NIH, are also interested in the atlasing approach. Three elements from neuroinformatics are visibly shaping research, even in the early stages of a new project to study development (the 'children's brains' project). First, there is a desire to give added value to a set of clinical scans by considering them as a sample, and to enhance these data through further analysis. Second, this large-scale sampling shapes the questions being posed in this endeavour; elements of interest are only apprehensible through large-scale comparison. Third, in making these comparisons, (human) inter-rater variability proved to be too great and led the NIH to seek the MNI's expertise, and to a close collaboration with the MNI to pursue this research. The dynamics of standardization and automation for pooling data, the idea that aggregation of scans will yield insights, and the search for bypassing human judgement in the evaluation of large numbers of scans are aligned to what can be accomplished with digital objectivity as a 'complex of technologies '. 115 As an approach to pursuing neuroscience, neuroinformatics thus seems to be shaping new research, above and beyond what individual technologies might be able to accomplish. During an interview, a leading researcher, when asked about the work of the Consortium, expressed the following view:
Oh, this is exciting. That is a really unique way to look at very subtle differences between individuals and brain anatomy. You wouldn't be able to do that with the naked eye, and you wouldn't be able to do it with ten subjects. You need a large database, you need sophisticated automatic ways to extract morphological features and then analyse them statistically in 3-d space, for all 100, 200 subjects. I think that's -I completely, well, we were talking about functional imaging -I see this as even more promising in a way, than functional imaging, to an extent. 116 Again, note the conflation of the rejection of opticism, and the call for an integration of statistical testing and automation. The system being put in place for cascading data is even more powerful than the imaging technologies that enable the gathering of this information. Once again, a parallel with earlier efforts can be made: in the relation between photography and the archive at the end of the 19th century, 'the central artefact of this system is not the camera but the filing cabinet'. 117 In both instances, faith is placed in the administration of quantified visual difference, rather than in the optical truth of the camera or scanner.
Objectivity and Rhetoric
Before moving on to the final discussion of digital objectivity as potentially characterizing a new type of science, I will note briefly yet another aspect of objectivity which I have not addressed explicitly up to now -objectivity as a rhetorical object. Up to now, the developments described in this paper have involved a medium-sized community within neuroscience. Bowker notes that databases, especially on a large scale, see their classification systems 'increasingly being yanked out of their institutional and political contexts, and applied in other fields with differing ontologies and associations'; and that 'getting any classification systems off the ground is. . . always a battle of "winning confidence" and "ingenious presentation" '. 118 The extremes of quantification and standardization that underlie ICBM's objectivity may be helping to win confidence and build trust in databases (to extend Porter's phrase), 119 in a context where disciplines with formerly distant approaches to the brain find that they are encouraged by funding agencies to work together.
Objectivity is at once a potent ideal, a set of methodological prescriptions and an agreed-upon way of working. The case of the digital atlases shows powerfully that the technological fix to the handling of data has had profound epistemological and ontological consequences, rather than just a minor (or even appreciable) impact on efficiency and research management. I would suggest that digital tools might be especially good at providing such interfaces -where disciplines can be translated as various attributes of a voxel; where data, questions, and analysis merge as features of a database; and where yet another algorithm can be implemented to interrogate the data. Digital objectivity, and the various instances of convergence it sustains, may therefore be an important feature of cyberscience.
There are constraints to the building and using of these tools, in which convergence is so crucial. The element of 'administration' is often central to corridor talk about the HBP and neuroinformatics. Proponents and sceptics alike are wary of having these resources overly weighed in the direction of data management, and burdened with stifling standardization. 120 In a sense, this is a well-known issue in sociology of science: the tension between accountability and professional autonomy. The sheer scale of these efforts, however, may mean that the impact of these digital tools goes beyond disciplinary concerns. While the need to develop common standards, and to develop a culture of data sharing, have been flagged as issues raised by neuroinformatics, 121 other consequences should also be of concern to both practitioners and analysts of cyberscience. The first of these is the obduracy of neuroinformatics resources. 122 While the integration of more data and more types of data increases the power of these atlases, the rigidity of these tools may increase proportionately. 123 These atlases also reinforce the importance of certain features, which I pointed out in the course of this discussion: variability, 'populations', demographic traits, and so on. While provisions are made for ensuring the translatability of many types of data, including new dimensions along the way may not prove feasible, leading either to the abandonment of the database, or to reinforcing the elements that are included as those most important in understanding normality and disease. This has been termed 'hardening of the categories', in the favourite aphorism of scholars of classifications. 124 Second, part of the rhetoric of cyberscience has been its democratizing effect, in giving greater access to scientific data to a greater number of researchers. Yet, in the case of neuroinformatics, the need for large-scale sampling may be shaping not only the kind of scientific questions that can be answered through neuroinformatics, but also increasing the scope of research projects, with concomitant effect on the size of research groups and institutions that can sustain such projects. This dynamic also seems to be at play in the field of genomics. 125 Finally, the displacement of human intervention in neuroinformatics may also have consequences for the kind of knowledge produced. Up to now, this concern has been voiced as fears that this mode of science will not be driven by 'the questions', but rather pursued as a managerial exercise. As seen in the case of atlases, the displacement of expertise away from an embodied observer has non-trivial consequences for notions of objectivity. If judgement and experience are delegated to technologies in neuroinformatics, it is likely that other notions that have been part of scientific practice also traditionally located in the subject (creativity, understanding, discovery and insight) will also be reshaped by informatics. In this sense, studies of the Human Brain Project and of cyberscience may indeed say much about the changing behaviour of scientists. 
Notes

